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Abstract
The paper discusses how Chile has moved between different models of  
enforcement regarding freedom of  information complaints. It shows how 
the creation of  a specialized agency to decide access to public information 
complaints impacts on the increase of  cases and, in turn, the administrative 
implementation of  alternative dispute resolution mechanisms influences the 
increase of  decisions and user satisfaction. By employing a method combi-
ning both quantitative and qualitative criteria, the paper evaluates the data 
available from 20 years of  access to information laws. First, it examines how 
freedom of  information was established in Chile by statute, legally entru-
sting its guarantee through judicial enforcement. Second, the paper reviews 
the creation of  an administrative agency –called Consejo para la Transpa-
rencia– in charge of  reviewing transparency complaints and expanding the 
exercise of  the right. Finally, the paper describes how the model of  conflict 
resolution has evolved and has received forms of  mediation that allow fa-
ster resolution of  cases and grant greater satisfaction to  citizens and public 
officials.
Keywords: Transparency. Freedom of  information. Dispute resolution.
Resumo
O documento discute como o Chile tem se movimentado entre diferentes 
modelos de aplicação em relação às reclamações sobre liberdade de infor-
mação. Mostra como a criação de uma agência especializada para decidir 
sobre o acesso às queixas de informação pública tem impacto no aumento 
dos casos e, por sua vez, a implementação administrativa de mecanismos 
alternativos de resolução de litígios influencia o aumento das decisões e a 
satisfação dos utilizadores. Ao utilizar um método que combina critérios 
quantitativos e qualitativos, o documento avalia os dados disponíveis a partir 
de 20 anos de acesso às leis de informação. Em primeiro lugar, examina 
como a liberdade de informação foi estabelecida no Chile por lei, confiando 
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legalmente sua garantia através da execução judicial. Em segundo lugar, o documento analisa a criação de 
um órgão administrativo - chamado Consejo para la Transparencia- encarregado de analisar as queixas so-
bre transparência e expandir o exercício do direito. Finalmente, o documento descreve como o modelo de 
resolução de conflitos evoluiu e recebeu formas de mediação que permitem uma resolução mais rápida dos 
casos e proporcionam maior satisfação aos cidadãos e funcionários públicos.
Palavras-chave: Transparência. Liberdade de informação. Resolução de litígios.
1 Introduction
The enforcement of  freedom of  information (FOI) laws is part of  one of  the central challenges to 
achieve higher levels of  transparency. How can we ensure that the promise of  transparency obligations 
comes true? When does a citizen effectively access the information that is required? Recent institutional 
designs have favored the creation of  independent agencies to resolve complaints regarding access to public 
information. Agencies are a key feature of  FOI laws. The approach and decisions adopted by these agencies 
impacts on a reduction of  transactional costs for an effective access to information. Therefore, and without 
the need of  legal change, the decisions agencies make will forge the way to make the recollection of  public 
information easier.
How can we assess the impact of  agencies in FOI enforcement? One way to analyze the influence and 
impact of  an independent agency is to examine the evidence of  cases decided under such institutional ar-
rangement. In other words, the creation of  an independent agency should impact on the number of  FOI 
cases decided.
The case of  Chile is particularly illustrative for this approach, since it shows a 20-year continuum in whi-
ch it is possible to study the transition from a legal recognition of  FOI to the creation of  an independent 
agency as an enforcement game changer. The right of  access to public information was recognized in Chile 
in 1999, through a legal reform. However, a mere legal right was not sufficient to bring about a change in 
the conditions of  state transparency. If  the requested state agency did not reply or deliver the information, 
the requester had to file a suit before courts which entails attorneys’ fees to begin charging. Time and legal 
costs were considerable obstacles to access public information. For a decade, only a few disputes reached 
the courts with meagre results, as it is examined in section II of  the paper.
In the meantime, in 2005, Chile amended its Constitution to enshrine a constitutional principle of  pu-
blicity applicable to all State bodies and agencies. And then, in 2006, the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights found Chile responsible for violating the right of  access to public information of  one of  its citizens, 
as part of  the human rights obligations to which States parties of  the American Convention on Human Ri-
ghts are subjected to1. Contrary to what one might think, the constitutional recognition of  the principle and 
the international protection of  FOI as a human right, did not bring about a significant change in the number 
of  cases. The normative change occurred at the level of  primary norms –to use Hart’s terminology–2 but it 
did not make any significant impact on more transparency claims.
The real change will take place with the creation of  a state agency specialized in transparency and access 
to public information. In 2009, the Law No. 20,285 on access to public information came into force, which 
created the Council for Transparency. The Council became the main tool for the promotion of  the right. 
The law also created a procedure that made it possible to qualitatively expand the exercise of  the right and 
the levels of  transparency in the country. If  in the first year of  operation, the Council resolved 274 cases, 
1 Case of  Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of  September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151.
2 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. p. 79ff.
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but in 2018, the Council solved 5,805 cases, which shows an increase of  2118.6% in the number of  cases3. 
This explosion alone demonstrates the explosion of  demands for access to information.
The access to information requests procedure has been facilitated both at the legal level and through 
administrative changes and technological tools. From a legal point of  view, the procedure allows any person 
to make information requests and if  the request is not fully satisfied, the same person can complaint be-
fore the Council for Transparency. Both procedures do not require legal assistance of  lawyers and they are 
completely free. And from an administrative and technological point of  view, the Transparency Council has 
implemented a Transparency Portal –a website that allows requests for access to information, cases follow-
-up and, eventually, to direct complaints before the Council. The digitalization of  the administrative process 
made it possible to reduce transaction costs associated with both requests and the complaint process.
These developments have expanded FOI, but the new turn in terms of  access to public information is 
being generated beyond the creation of  an agency and legal and technological changes. In 10 years of  the 
Law No. 20,285, the experience accumulated by the Council for Transparency and the type of  cases solved 
by the Council, have allowed managing FOI complaints switching the adjudicatory decision of  the Council 
for a mediation that anticipates the resolution of  the complaint itself. This process is known as “Anticipated 
Conflict Resolution System” (in Spanish, “Sistema Anticipado de Resolución de Conflictos” or SARC). The 
SARC process seeks to solve the case with the agreement of  the required state body, in matters of  “less 
complexity”.4 Although there have been some precedents of  the use of  this system since 2010, its intensive 
use has been implemented since 2016. From that year, the composition of  the type of  cases decided by the 
Council for Transparency has changed. In simple terms, in that year, the number of  cases decided under 
SARC amounted to 1,158, out of  a total of  4,277, which is equivalent to 27,05% of  the total number of  
cases in 2016. This percentage keeps rising, as it is examined in section IV of  this paper. The evolution of  
the type of  cases decided and their composition allow us to understand how the Council has mutated in 
its functions, from an administrative agency that mainly adjudicated cases to one that manages complaints 
through mediation mechanisms.
This paper provides a look at dispute resolution for requests and complaints about access to public in-
formation. Unlike the reflection on this issue, for example, in the United States –where academic debate fo-
cuses on the litigious phase and its operating costs–,5 the Chilean case allows us to examine how the change 
in the enforcement model improves access to public information, by increasing the number of  complaints 
that were inhibited under a judicial model and by facilitating their resolution through a successful adminis-
trative mediation process.
This paper studies the change in the model of  enforcement of  transparency obligations, from a litigation 
model to an increasingly mediation model. The transformation of  the model is based on the analysis of  the 
figures of  20 years in which Chile has gone through different legal rules and institutional designs to promote 
access to public information. In the last phase, the Council for Transparency has changed the management 
of  complaints to strongly favor mediation as a way of  resolving cases.
The hypothesis is as follows: the creation of  a specialized agency to decide access to public information 
complaints impacts on the increase of  cases and, in turn, the administrative implementation of  alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms influences the increase of  decisions and user satisfaction.
3 The data has been obtained from the same Council for Transparency through a freedom of  information request. Every file can 
be found and downloaded here: https://bit.ly/2wuOHqe. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
4 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Dirección Jurídica. Unidad de Admisibilidad y SARC. Procedimiento: Admisibilidad. 
2018. p. 9.
5 GRUNEWALD, M. Freedom of  information act dispute resolution. Administrative Law Review, v. 40, n. 1, p. 34, 1988.; VAUGHN, 
R. Administrative alternatives and the Federal Freedom of  Information Act. Ohio State Law Journal, v. 45, p. 202-208, 1984.; RE-
LYEA, H. Federal freedom of  information policy: highlights of  recent developments. Government Information Quarterly, v. 26, p. 317, 
2009.; KWOKA, M. The Freedom of  Information Act trial. American University Law Review, v. 61, n. 2, 2011.
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The methodology used is diverse, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative criteria. This paper 
evaluates the data available from 20 years of  access to information laws. The information was obtained in 
the following way. For the first decade of  the regulation of  the law (1999-2009), we have chosen to collect 
the data from the secondary literature that has studied the judicial resolution of  access to information clai-
ms. Based on the sample obtained, judicial decisions –as primary sources– were collected both from official 
sources, such as the Judicial Archive, and from electronic search platforms, using VLex. Two methods were 
carried out to review the jurisprudence of  the second decade (2009-2019), in which the Council for Trans-
parency plays a leading role. First, the Transparency Portal, administered by the Council, was used to extract 
its open data on requests and complaints. Secondly, a request for access to public information was made 
to the very same Council for Transparency, in particular to obtain the samples made by the Directorate of  
Studies. The examination and analysis of  the data was carried out under qualitative criteria of  institutional 
design, that is, by examining the incentives that hindered or favored the number of  cases resolved –both 
in the judicial model and in the Council’s model–, as well as in user satisfaction, measured by the Council’s 
Directorate of  Studies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the origin of  the right of  access to public infor-
mation in Chile but demonstrates how legal –and even constitutional– recognition did not have a significant 
impact on the number of  cases litigated but, rather, complaints were scarce. Section III analyses the crea-
tion of  the Council for Transparency and its role as a game changer, reviewing case data and its explosion 
in relation to the first decade of  the right of  access to information. Section IV examines a new shift in the 
resolution of  transparency cases: the creation and intensive use of  SARC as a method of  resolving com-
plaints through mediation. The paper concludes that the Chilean model of  enforcement of  access to public 
information demonstrates increasing requests and complaints by citizens and that its exercise has been faci-
litated by the creation of  an independent agency that today favors mediation mechanisms in the resolution 
of  disputes.
2  Creating a new right: freedom of information as a legal right and its 
constitutional transformation
In Chile, FOI is a fundamental right, recognized by the Constitutional Court,6 and, at the same time, 
a human right, as declared by the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights.7 To understand the status of  
the right, it is necessary to review the historical trajectory of  several reforms and changes that led to this 
recognition.
The original text of  the Constitution did not contain any express reference to a principle of  publicity 
of  the acts of  State bodies or a FOI right. The incorporation of  rules of  transparency and FOI, would be 
done progressively through different reforms to the legal system. The direct antecedent of  FOI begins at 
the legislative level, in 1999, with the amendment of  the Organic Constitutional Law No. 18,575, 8 which 
created a right of  access to public information for every person. The right allowed anyone to request infor-
mation from any agency of  the Executive branch of  the government. This right was limited on the grounds 
of  secrecy or reservation established by the law, and its violation was subject to complaint before the courts.
The new legal right –though it changed the paradigm regarding public authorities’ conduct–, had several 
limitations. At least three of  them should be highlighted.9 In the first place, the right was only enforceable 
6 Decision of  the Chilean Constitutional Court (hereinafter, “STC”), R. 634-06, c. 9-10.
7 Case of  Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of  September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151.
8 Law N° 19.653, on Administrative Integrity.
9 See, in general, HARASIC, D. Historia de la consagración del derecho fundamental de acceso a la información pública en Chile. 
In: LETELIER, R.; REJEVIC, E. (eds.). Transparencia en la administración pública. Santiago: Thomson Reuters, 2010.; OLMEDO, J. 
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against agencies inside the Executive branch of  the government, excluding the National Congress or the 
Judiciary and other state bodies that have constitutional autonomy –such as the Central Bank or the Consti-
tutional Court. Secondly, although the grounds for secrecy were established in the law, the President of  the 
Republic was allowed to create new cases of  secrecy which were expanded by the equivalent to an executive 
order, reversing the general rule of  publicity. Finally, the legislation placed the burden of  enforcement upon 
individuals: there was not an independent agency in charge of  enforcing FOI obligations, nor a special pro-
cedure for the protection of  the right.
Progress towards the constitutionalization of  FOI will take a decisive step with the constitutional amen-
dments of  2005. In particular, article 8, paragraph 2, which created the constitutional principle of  publicity. 
Such principle provides the following:
The acts and resolutions of  the organs of  the State, as well as their foundations and the procedures 
they use, are public. However, only a law of  qualified quorum may establish the reservation or secrecy 
of  those or of  them, when the publicity affects the due fulfillment of  the functions of  said organs, the 
rights of  persons, the security of  the Nation, or the national interest.
Although transparency and publicity was considered as part of  an implicit principle of  Chilean 
constitutionalism,10 the constitutional reform clearly established the scope and limits of  transparency. Gi-
ven its location in the constitutional text and the literal text of  the provision, every state body is bound by 
this principle (and not only the Executive branch of  the government, as was the case with Law No. 19,653 
mentioned above).11 In addition, the Constitution prescribes that information can be secret but only if  it is 
established by a law of  qualified quorum –that is, those that require an absolute majority of  the deputies and 
senators (art. 66 of  the Chilean Constitution)– and under four strictly defined grounds: the due fulfillment 
of  the functions of  the organ, the rights of  persons, the security of  the Nation or the national interest.
At the same time, there were two events that ended up sealing the fundamental character of  FOI: its 
recognition as a human right under the American Convention on Human Rights and its recognition as a 
constitutional right by the case law of  the Chilean Constitutional Court.
In the first case, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights – precisely in a case against Chile – would 
declare that freedom of  expression includes not only a freedom in terms of  a non-interference state obli-
gation, but also the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of  all kinds.12 It will be the first 
international tribunal to recognize FOI as a positive obligation of  States. Subsequently, it will be followed by 
the Human Rights Committee13 and, albeit with hesitations and nuances, by the European Court of  Human 
Rights.14
Acerca del proceso de institucionalización del derecho de acceso a la información pública en Chile. In: LETELIER, R.; RAJEVIC, 
E. (eds.) Transparencia en la administración pública. Santiago: Thomson Reuters, 2010.; VVAA. Hacia una nueva institucionalidad de acceso a 
la información pública en Chile. Santiago: Fundación Pro Acceso, 2008. p. 9-67; ALLESCH, J.; OBANDO, I. El amparo del derecho de 
acceso a la información pública. Ius et Praxis, v. 11, n. 2, 2015.
10 EVANS ESPIÑEIRA, E. La Constitución explicada. Santiago: Lexis Nexis, 2006. p. 14; CONTESSE, J. La opacidad del legislador 
y la indulgencia judicial: jurisprudencia y práctica sobre el acceso a la información pública en Chile. In: GONZÁLEZ, Felipe (ed.). 
Libertad de expresión en Chile. Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2006. p. 103ff.
11 SÁNCHEZ, Moisés. Nueva institucionalidad de acceso a la información pública en Chile: comentarios legales. In: VVAA. Hacia 
una nueva institucionalidad de acceso a la información pública en Chile. Santiago: Fundación Pro Acceso, 2008. p. 19; FERNÁNDEZ, M. 
Causales de secreto o reserva en el ordenamiento jurídico chileno. In: VVAA. Hacia una nueva institucionalidad de acceso a la información 
pública en Chile. Santiago: Fundación Pro Acceso, 2008. p. 38; RUIZ-TAGLE, P. Los derechos fundamentales ante la reforma del 
2005. Revista de Derecho Público, Universidad de Chile, v. 68, p. 47, 2006.
12 Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile (2006) §76.
13 HRC. General comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of  opinion and expression). 102nd session 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, at ¶18; Toktaku-
nov v. Kyrgyzstan, Comm. No. 1470/2006, 7.4 (2011).
14 GISBERT, R. Bustos. The right to freedom of  expression. In: GARCÍA ROCA, J.; MACHETTI, P. Santolaya (eds.). Europe of  
rights: a compendium on the European Convention of  Human Rights. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2012. p. 374; CON-
TRERAS, P. Secretos de Estado: transparencia y seguridad nacional. Santiago: Thomson Reuters, 2014. p. 26-28; HERNÁNDEZ, M. 
El derecho de acceso a la información pública en el ordenamiento jurídico español: legitimación subjetiva, derecho aún no funda-
mental y balance crítico. Transparencia & Sociedad, v. 4, 2016.
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In the second case, the Chilean Constitutional Court recognized the constitutional nature of  FOI.15 The 
Court affirmed that it is an “implicit” right under the Constitution, “as an essential mechanism for the full 
validity of  the democratic regime [...].”16 The ruling interpreted the right as deriving from the democratic 
clause of  the Constitution (article 4), freedom of  expression (article 19 No. 12) and the constitutional 
principle of  publicity (article 8). For the Court, the purpose of  the right is “to guarantee a democratic re-
publican regime that guarantees the control of  power, obliging the authorities to be held accountable by 
individuals”.17
The strategy of  legalizing and recognizing FOI in the Constitution, but under a judicial enforcement 
model, did not have a major impact or penetration in Chilean society. In this stage of  FOI developments, 
there was not a unified effort to promote this right. For example, from the point of  view of  the number of  
requests for access to information, it is not possible to determine reliable data since the request procedures 
were not centrally administered nor processed on a digital basis. Therefore, between 1999 and 2009, it is not 
possible to determine the number of  requests for access to public information.
Despite the fact of  the lack of  central data concerning FOI requests, it is possible to investigate the 
number and type of  claims about the denial of  access to public information. These are judicial disputes 
that were initiated on the occasion of  a refused request. From a qualitative point of  view and as a part of  a 
doctrinal analysis, the studies by Contesse18 and Allesch and Obando19 can be reviewed. On the basis of  the 
information reconstructed by these studies and the direct inspection of  the Judicial Archive, it is possible 
to determine the following figures.
In ten years, only few FOI legal disputes can be traced. Table 1 summarizes the data found:
Table 1 – List of  FOI cases between 1999 and 2009
Source: own representation based on data collected from Contesse (2006), Allesch & Obando (2005) and the Judicial 
Archive.
This sample allows us to observe the behavior of  the courts in the resolution of  transparency dispu-
tes. First, based on the information collected, it is possible to find 17 court cases but in two cases it is not 
possible to reconstruct the information. Based on the 15 cases in which information was obtained, 10 were 
reviewed in the second instance by an appellate court. The results, in terms of  access to public information, 
are limited. Most of  the courts ordered the denial of  access to information. 9 of  the 15 cases (60%) rejected 
access to information and only 6 cases (40%) ordered the release of  information.
15 STC R. 634-07.
16 STC R. 634-07, cons. 9º.
17 STC R. 1990, cons. 25.
18 CONTESSE, J. La opacidad del legislador y la indulgencia judicial: jurisprudencia y práctica sobre el acceso a la información 
pública en Chile. In: GONZÁLEZ, Felipe (ed.). Libertad de expresión en Chile. Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2006.
19 ALLESCH, J.; OBANDO, I. El amparo del derecho de acceso a la información pública. Ius et Praxis, v. 11, n. 2, 2015.
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While it is not possible to accurately confirm all possible FOI litigation in this period, this sample allows 
us to understand that the enforcement of  a legally recognized right through courts is practically anecdotal 
and required overcoming the obstacles of  the various judicial processes, both in the first and second instan-
ce. The scarce numbers presented here will contrast with the enormous progress and increase in requests for 
access to information and its subsequent enforcement through the Council for Transparency.
3 The Council for Transparency as a game changer
In 2009 – a decade after the creation of  FOI as a legal right in Chile – the promise of  transparency was 
yet to be fulfilled. Congress passed a special law aimed at protecting FOI. Law No. 20,285 on Access to 
Public Information was published on August 20, 2008 and entered into force on April 21, 2009. Law No. 
20,285 embodied the right of  access and the principle of  publicity through rules and institutions, including 
the creation of  the Council for Transparency as the body that guarantees the right. This section describes 
how the law and the creation of  the Council was a game changer in terms of  FOI.
The law created a new procedure for information requests. State bodies must deliver the requested in-
formation, if  it exists, if  it is in their possession, if  it does not affect a cause for secrecy, and in the manner 
required by law. The State has a period of  20 working days to deliver the information, and it is exceptionally 
extendable for 10 more working days, when “circumstances exist that make it difficult to gather the reques-
ted information” (article 14 of  the Transparency Law). The procedure is free of  charge and does not require 
the legal assistance of  an attorney.
Beyond the law and the new procedure created, the fact that a new specialized entity was in charge of  
the administration of  the system brought significant changes in a short time. One of  the measures with the 
greatest impact was the creation of  a Transparency Portal, a website that allows people to easily and quickly 
exercise their rights.20 The Transparency Portal, as such, is administered by the Council and has been develo-
ped from agreements with different public agencies that have been integrated into the platform, since there 
is no legal obligation to do so.21 By simplifying the procedure for managing requests, both for users and for 
public officials, the Portal has quickly added numerous agencies. The Portal started its operations in 2013. 
As of  April 2019, the Portal has a total of  817 public bodies using the Portal.22
20 See: www.portaltransparencia.cl. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
21 From: https://www.portaltransparencia.cl/PortalPdT/web/guest/quienes-somos. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
22 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Informe Mensual de Estadísticas. Abril, 2019. p. 4.
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Table 2 – Public agencies that use the Transparency Portal
Source: Consejo para la Transparencia (2019), p. 7.
The site allows the creation of  a profile and enter requests for access to information. Through a system 
of  alerts, if  the request is not answered within the deadline or the information is denied, the person can 
immediately file a complaint with the Council for Transparency, whose procedure, although not completely 
electronic, allows the process to be followed and the information to be obtained electronically once the 
complaint is favorably resolved.
The figures obtained from the Council for Transparency allow us to conclude that Law No. 20,285 and 
its digital implementation has allowed a significant number of  requests for access to information to be 
made. In comparison with other countries, the figures for recent years far exceed the use of  similar laws to 
make requests for access to information. This may have multiple explanations. In the case of  Chile, in the 
decade of  1999-2009 there were no figures that would allow comparison with the last 10 years (2009-2019). 
However, since Law No. 20,285 came into force and then, since the implementation of  the Portal, the num-
ber of  requests has increased systematically over time.
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Table 3 – Number of  FOI requests, 2009-2019
Source: own representation based on data collected from Consejo para la Transparencia (2019b). Information collected 
from the year 2019 is updated to 26.04.2019.
The digital implementation of  the requests and claims, together with an independent and specialized 
agency, allowed a leap in the use of  the law and its enforcement. Unlike the decade of  1999-2009, when 
we did not have records regarding requests for access to information, there is now a digital repository of  
almost all requests, whose information can be downloaded and is available in open data.23 With regard to the 
number of  requests for access to information, the Council has stated that in 10 years of  the law a number 
of  1,000,000 requests have been made. 24 According to the then President of  the Council, “[t]he country can 
be proud to have the most intensely used transparency system by citizens in the world[,]” adding that Chile 
has “four times more requests for information per capita than Mexico, 10 times more than England, which 
are the international benchmarks in the matter and left long before us”.25
To check the information, access to the reports of  the Council’s Directorate of  Studies was gained.26 The 
report reconstructs the figures from different sources, since the Portal only began operating in 2013. Throu-
gh a projection and reconstruction of  the figures of  the Ministry of  the General Secretariat of  the Presiden-
cy, it determines that as of  April 2019, 1,016,647 requests for access to public information were made.27 In 
relation to the comparison with other countries, the Council collected statistical information from England, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Serbia, but it is not based on this selection. In any case, the available information is 
easily contrastable with the official sites of  the Information Commissioner’s Office of  England,28 the Natio-
nal Institute of  Transparency, Access to Information of  Mexico,29 the Unit of  Access to Public Information 
of  Uruguay,30 and the Commissioner for Public Importance and Personal Data Protection.31 According to 
23 From: https://www.portaltransparencia.cl/PortalPdT/web/guest/opendata-y-analisis. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
24 From: https://www.consejotransparencia.cl/cplt-celebro-1-millon-de-solicitudes-de-acceso-a-la-informacion-a-organismos-
del-estado/. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
25 From: https://www.consejotransparencia.cl/cplt-celebro-1-millon-de-solicitudes-de-acceso-a-la-informacion-a-organismos-
del-estado/. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
26 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Sin título [Estadísticas de solicitudes de acceso a la información], 2019b and CON-
SEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Minuta comparación internacional: sistema de transparência. 2019c.
27 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Sin título [Estadísticas de solicitudes de acceso a la información]. 2019b.
28 From: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/our-information/annual-reports. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
29 From: http://snt.org.mx/index.php/informacioninteres/estadisticas. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
30 From: https://www.gub.uy/unidad-acceso-informacion-publica/datos-y-estadisticas/datos/responsables-de-transparencia. 
Last visited: 01 june 2019.
31 From: https://www.poverenik.rs/en/o-nama/monthly-statistical-reports.html. Last visited: 01 june 19.
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the report, the number of  requests for access to information can be summarized in  the following table:
Table 4 – Evolution of  the total number of  requests for access to information in the United Kingdom, Mexico, Chile, 
Uruguay and Serbia
Source: Consejo para la Transparencia (2019c), p. 5.
Based on the information collected, it is possible to determine that there are more than 200,000 
requests for access to information per year, starting in 2016. By year and in total, there are far more countries 
with legislations that served as a source for the creation of  Law No. 20,285 –such as England and Mexico 
– and other countries that have specialized agencies – such as Uruguay or Serbia.
The intensive use of  the law is manifested in its enforcement through demands for transparency. 
According to information obtained from the Council for Transparency, the number of  FOI claims made in 
this decade totals 29,419 (including active transparency claims and access to information protections). Over 
the years, we have grown from 274 transparency complaints resolved in 2009 to a total of  5,805 in 2018. 
This information can be graphed as follows:
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Table 5 – Number of  FOI decisions, 2009-2019
Source: own representation from the data collected from Consejo para la Transparencia (2019e). Information collected from the 
year 2019 is updated to 26.04.2019.
The numbers of  transparency claims continue to grow over time, along with the increase in requests for 
information. In this case, one can observe the distance between the sample of  17 cases litigated in courts 
in the decade 1999-2009 and only the first year of  Law No. 20,285, in which the Council for Transparency 
resolved 274 claims, that is, an increase of  more than 1,600% in a single year, approximately. The system 
created by Law No. 20,285 has turned what once was a province of  the judiciary into an administrative ma-
nagement of  FOI conflicts and complaints. With an independent agency, not only has the number of  cases 
litigated and resolved increased –now before the Council and not the courts– but the figures show a steady 
growth in administrative or quasi-jurisdictional resolution on the part of  the Council.
4 Changing courts for mediation
The procedure for legal claims under Law No. 20, 285 does not currently have rules that enable the use 
of  alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, unlike other countries. 32 As it has been pointed out, 
one of  the factors that allow this type of  mechanism to be more successful is that “it is preferable for the le-
gislation on access to information to expressly state that the body competent to resolve complaints, appeals 
or amparo is empowered to seek an agreement between the parties”.33 To date, such a mechanism has been 
adapted by the Council for Transparency without a clear legal mandate consistent with the basic rules that 
govern complaints proceedings. In any case, Congress is discussing an amendment to the Law No. 20,285 
which, among other matters, includes an express rule on the matter.34
32 DUNION, K.; ROJAS, H. Sistemas alternativos de resolución de conflictos y derecho de acceso a la información pública: análi-
sis de las experiencias escocesa, inglesa e irlandesa. Transparencia & Sociedad, n. 3, p. 80-81, 2015.
33 DUNION, K.; ROJAS, H. Sistemas alternativos de resolución de conflictos y derecho de acceso a la información pública: análi-
sis de las experiencias escocesa, inglesa e irlandesa. Transparencia & Sociedad, n. 3, p. 80, 2015.
34 See: Cámara de Diputados, Boletín 12.100-07. Avaliable at: https://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=12616&p
rmBoletin=12100-07. Last visited: 01 june 2019.: “Article 24 bis: From the presentation of  the claim or amparo, the Council may 
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Shortly after its creation, the Council for Transparency decided to mount an ADR pilot.35 This plan 
sought to anticipate the resolution of  the case through the introduction of  negotiation and mediation tech-
niques between the Council and the required state body.36 The central idea was that officials trained with the 
Harvard’s negotiation method37 could embark on an early exit from the procedure before the award decision 
by the Board of  Commissioners of  the Transparency Council. According to Rojas, the criteria for selecting 
cases at the time were as follows: (i) that the cases were of  low or medium complexity, (ii) that it would 
only apply to claims for access to information (and not for breach of  active transparency obligations), and 
(iii) that the request wasn’t fulfilled by the State and the deadline for doing so was already expired.38 As we 
will review below, criterions have not varied considerably in the current SARC formulation as stated in the 
original Council for Transparency documentation.39
The purpose of  the pilot program was described as follows in the Council’s 2010 Institutional Re-
port: “[t]he Alternative Case Resolution System procedure was developed to contribute to decongesting 
the workload in the processing of  substantive cases, give greater prominence, control and satisfaction of  
the parties, reduce processing times (opportunity principle), give greater flexibility in the search for so-
lutions (facilitation principle) and selectivity and efficiency in the use of  resources (procedural economy 
principle)”.40 Accordingly to the report, “anticipated processes of  conflict resolution were implemented 
[...], promoting preliminary instances of  agreements between citizen-public organization streamlining the 
processes of  information delivery. In this process, 80% of  the cases presented were successful”.41 In accor-
dance with the study by Rojas, 
[t]he implementation of  SARC had a positive impact on case management: increasing the number of  
cases resolved, increasing the level of  satisfaction of  complainants and liaisons, decreasing processing 
times, decreasing the number of  pending cases, contributing to the increase in substantive decisions, 
increasing efficiency in the use of  resources.42
SARC is now formalized in the official documents of  the Council for Transparency. In a procedural ma-
nual of  the unit in charge of  the admissibility analysis of  cases, it is stated that the SARC procedure may be 
applied according to the following. First, “less complex” cases. The document does not give a definition of  
this concept but it does give examples: these are cases in which “information that has already been declared 
public is denied; arguments are invoked that do not innovate with respect to the consolidated jurisprudence 
of  the Board of  Commissioners, or when the basis of  the protection is that the body did not respond to the 
request for information”.43 Under such hypotheses, the unit initiates negotiations with the requested body.
The SARC procedure is completely informal and depends only on the steps that the official can take 
promote alternative instances of  conflict resolution between the applicant, the requested body and the third party involved, if  any.
If  the parties are not satisfied with a proposed solution, in the event that any of  the parties has opted to provide information or 
opinions, this may not be considered as evidence in the final resolution of  the case.
Likewise, the provisional decisions adopted by the Council, during this instance, shall not disqualify it from deciding the case de-
finitively”.
35 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Memoria institucional. 2009. p. 39.
36 ROJAS, H. Sistema alternativos de resolución de amparos al derecho de acceso a la información en el Consejo para la Transpar-
encia. Derecho Público Iberoamericano, n. 7, p. 195-196, 2016.
37 See: Harvard Negotiation Project. Available at: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/research_projects/harvard-negotia-
tion-project/. Last visited: 01 june 2019.
38 ROJAS, H. Sistema alternativos de resolución de amparos al derecho de acceso a la información en el Consejo para la Transpar-
encia. Derecho Público Iberoamericano, n. 7, p. 196, 2016.
39 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Dirección Jurídica. Unidad de Admisibilidad y SARC. Procedimiento: admisibilidad. 
2018.
40 Consejo para la Transparencia Memoria institucional, 20010, p. 41.
41 Consejo para la Transparencia Memoria institucional, 20010, p. 16.
42 ROJAS, H. Sistema alternativos de resolución de amparos al derecho de acceso a la información en el Consejo para la Transpar-
encia. Derecho Público Iberoamericano, n. 7, p. 201, 2016.
43 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Dirección Jurídica. Unidad de Admisibilidad y SARC. Procedimiento: admisibilidad. 
2018. p. 9.
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among the interested parties. This can be done by contacting the public body via email or phone call and 
presenting arguments as to why the information should be provided or how to assist the public body in 
responding to the request for access. This informality of  the administrative procedure has allowed for “con-
versation” between the independent enforcement agency and the public body required to comply with the 
law. Based on the conversations, the jurisprudential criteria of  the Transparency Council itself  are clarified 
in order to guide the action of  the public body. It is also allowed to clarify when the information does not 
exist or when a response must simply be given to the information requestor’s concern. In short, SARC me-
diated information for the management of  the conflict and its prompt resolution.
The alternatives that can be generated with this mechanism are the following: i) withdrawal, in which the 
information applicant agrees with the information obtained through SARC; ii) declaration of  delivery of  
the information, when the information corresponds to that requested but the applicant has not declared its 
withdrawal; iii) decision of  inadmissibility, when the body accredits that it complied with its delivery obliga-
tions in a timely manner; and iv) the failure of  SARC, when the information is not provided, does not satisfy 
the applicant or what was provided does not correspond to what was requested, thus the claim for access to 
the information follows its procedure for an effective decision by the Board of  Commissioners.
This procedure has only intensified in recent times. Starting in 2015, the Transparency Council adopts 
an institutional decision to hire personnel to initiate procedures exclusively within the framework of  SARC, 
aiming to reduce the time taken to decide cases and favor the expectations and satisfaction of  those invol-
ved in the procedure.44 Although there was already a pilot that worked the first 5 years of  the Council,45 it 
wouldn’t be until  2015 that the numbers of  cases closed through SARC would start to change dramatically. 
The following graph explains the evolution of  cases decided through SARC.
Table 6 – Number of  SARC decisions, 2009-2019
Source: own representation from the data collected from Consejo para la Transparencia (2019e). Information collected 
from the year 2019 is updated to 26.04.2019.
44 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Memoria institucional. 2015, §2, 7.
45 ROJAS, H. Sistema alternativos de resolución de amparos al derecho de acceso a la información en el Consejo para la Transpar-
encia. Derecho Público Iberoamericano, n. 7, p. 203-216, 2016.
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Since 2010, a total of  6,183 cases have been resolved by the SARC mechanism. This figure represents 
21% of  the total number of  cases resolved by the Transparency Council in its 10 years of  operation. Al-
though a fifth of  all decisions have been mediated through SARC, the interesting thing is to review the trend 
and the numbers that have been generated since 2015, in which SARC’s work in the solution of  cases is 
resolutely installed. In the first 5 years of  operation of  the Council (2009-2014), 9,366 cases were resolved 
but only 679 cases were mediated by SARC, which constitutes 7% of  the total number of  cases in that pe-
riod. From 2015 onwards, the ratio changes considerably. Between 2015 and 201946 a total of  20,053 cases 
have been resolved, of  which 5,504 correspond to those mediated by SARC, i.e. 27% of  the total cases. If  
one looks only at 2018, one can analyze how SARC is increasing its case resolution rate, since of  the total of  
5,805 cases resolved, 1,980 were mediated by SARC, which constitutes 34% of  the total number of  cases in 
that year. The next third corresponds to inadmissible cases and the last third to cases meriting a substantive 
decision.47 In conclusion, today SARC represents a third of  the type of  cases resolved by the Council for 
Transparency.
Its relevance in the process of  resolution of  cases it is not only demonstrated by its growth, on the part 
of  the Council. In addition, it shows better numbers of  satisfaction of  users and public officials. Accor-
dingly to the Council’s “2018 Public and Private Client Satisfaction Study”, 90% of  public officials charged 
with responding to requests for access to information prefer SARC to the regular case-decision procedure.48 
Users value the SARC instance because it makes it faster to have an outcome on the complaint.49
5 Conclusion
The Chilean model of  FOI enforcement has moved from a litigious model to a model of  mediation. It 
has changed the bench for a handshake. In 20 years of  different legal regulations on transparency and access 
to information matters, Chile has legally recognized FOI, first with legal rank, but later under a constitu-
tional basis. However, legal recognition alone does not make FOI effective. The following lessons can be 
drawn from a review of  existing data in Chile.
First, that implementing a transparency law with an independent agency is a game changer. The Council 
for Transparency, through various actions, enabled an unprecedented extension in access to public informa-
tion requests. The numbers obtained from the Council’s 10 years of  operation show a system in expansion 
and with a considerable growth of  FOI requests, per capita, in relation to countries with similar legislations.
Second, that the administrative management of  transparency conflicts has been transformed from a 
quasi-jurisdictional adjudicatory model to a model of  increasingly mediation among the participants of  a 
transparency complaint process. The expansion of  mediated solutions today reaches a third of  the total 
decisions of  the Council for Transparency and exhibits high rates of  satisfaction among those who enter 
this procedure.
The evidence of  the Chilean case provides empirical basis to the theoretical advantages of  ADR, in ma-
naging administrative processes such as transparency and access to information. The volume of  data allows 
confirming the trends in this matter and contrasting the success of  enforcement models based on judicial 
litigation and those that favor the intervention of  a specialized agency with ADR mechanisms.
46 Information collected from the year 2019 is updated to 26.04.2019.
47 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. 10 Años. 2019f. p. 65.
48 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Estudio de satisfacción de clientes privados y públicos: resultados generales. 2018b. p. 43.
49 CONSEJO PARA LA TRANSPARENCIA. Estudio de satisfacción de clientes privados y públicos: resultados generales. 2018b. p. 25.
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